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The implications of different cash in advance (CIA) constraints for open economies are worked 
out. If CIA constraints are only for consumption expenditures, changes in the rate of growth of 
money will have no steady state effects. If all transactions, even those involving bonds, are 
subject to CIA constraints, an increase in the rate of growth of money will reduce savings and 
steady state consumption, and have no steady state effects on capital. If investment is not subject 
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I. Introduction 
  In the Macroeconomics literature concerned with policy issues for open economies, money is 
usually introduced into the model by assuming that instantaneous utility is a function of consumption 
and real money holdings, as in Sidrauski (1967). The seminal papers in this literature are by Obstfeld 
(1981a,b). In this literature relatively small attention has been paid to the implications of introducing 
money through cash in advance (CIA) constraints, as in Stockman (1981).
i,  ii 
  An important result of Stockman's is that the implications of his model, which is for a closed 
economy, are sensitive to whether there is a CIA constraint on consumption alone or on consumption 
and investment. He shows that when there is a CIA constraint on investment as well as on 
consumption then an increase in the rate of growth of money reduces the steady state capital stock, as 
the CIA acts as a tax on investment. On the other hand when there is a CIA constraint on 
consumption alone then there is no effect on the steady state capital stock. 
  In this paper, I consider the implications of different CIA constraints for a small open 
economy. I start with a utility maximizing representative household with time separable preferences. 
In that setting, I show that if there is a CIA constraint on consumption alone then, again, changes in 
the rate of growth of money will have no steady state effects. Then I assume that all transactions, 
including transactions involving internationally traded bonds, are subject to CIA constraints. With 
this assumption, which is very much in line with the traditional IS-LM-BP approach to open 
economy macroeconomics, I show that time separable utility functions, with a fixed rate of time 
preference, are no longer suitable.
iii  The reason is that with CIA constraints on bonds, the real rate 
of return on bonds are not constant. Thus, the fixed rate of time preference can no longer be set equal 
to a fixed rate of interest in order to ensure the existence of a steady state. 
  To circumvent the above problem, I proceed by employing Uzawa (1968) preferences, which 
assume that the rate of time preference is an increasing function of instantaneous utility. These are 
the same preferences which are employed by Obstfeld (1981a,b). It, therefore, allows me to contrast 
the policy implication of models with CIA constraints with models with money in the utility 
function.    2
  Obstfeld (1981), abstracting completely from investment, shows that with Uzawa preferences 
and money in the utility function, an increase in the rate of growth of money will result in a fall in 
steady state real money holdings and a rise in steady state consumption. The reason is that in his 
model the rate of time preference must be equal to the real rate of interest in the steady state.
iv  T h e  
increase in the rate of growth of money increases the inflation rate. This increases the cost of holding 
real balances. Hence, there must be a substitution away from real money holdings, and towards 
consumption, along the same indifference curve in the steady state. In order to increase steady state 
consumption, the representative agent must be accumulating assets along the adjustment path. Thus, 
in the short run after the increase in the rate of growth of money there will be a sharp fall in 
consumption and real money holdings, leading to a current account surplus. After that, both 
consumption and real money holdings increase along the adjustment path to the new steady state 
equilibrium. 
  I show that if we maintain the Uzawa preferences, but introduce money into the model 
through a CIA constraint on all transactions (even transactions involving bonds) then the adjustment 
of the economy will be in sharp contrast to Obstfeld's. With CIA constraints on bond purchases, an 
increase in the rate of growth of money will reduce the rate of return on bonds. This will in the short 
run reduce savings, which will reduce consumption and real money holdings in the new steady state. 
Consumption and real money holdings will rise in the short run, and will then be falling along the 
adjustment path to the new steady state.   
  I proceed by introducing investment without adjustment costs into the model. I show that if 
there are CIA constraints on all transactions (including transactions involving assets and investment 
goods) then an increase in the rate of growth of money will not have any effects on the steady state 
capital stock.
v  The reason is that then the higher rate of growth of money taxes both bond purchases 
and investment in the same way. 
  Next, I consider the case in which investment expenditures are not subject to CIA constraints, 
while all other transactions are. I show that, then, an increase in the rate of growth of money will 
increase the steady state capital stock. The reason is that, in this case, the increase in the inflation rate 
acts as a tax on bonds while it does not act as a tax on capital.
vi  Finally, I conclude that if investment   3
is subject to adjustment costs, some of which are not subject to CIA constraints, because they are 
intangible (e.g., costs resulting from congestions in the firm), then an increase in the rate of growth of 
money should increase the steady state capital. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The problem of the representative agent with time 
separable preferences is set out in Section II. The effects of changes in the rate of growth of money 
with Uzawa preferences are considered in Section III. Investment is introduced into the model in 
Section IV. Some concluding remarks are made in Section V. 
 
II. The Model with Time Separable Preferences 
  Some of the assumptions of the model correspond closely to Obstfeld's (1981a). The foreign 
currency price of the single good in the model is fixed at P
*. The economy is small and takes P
* as 
given. P
* is set equal to 1. The domestic currency price of this good is P=EP
*, where E is the 
exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). The rate of inflation is 
equal to the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency (t/Et), which is denoted by ,t. 
  The preferences of the representative agent are given by a time separable utility function:   
func { {INT _0^ INF } ~ e sup {- theta t } ~ U( {c} sub t ) ~ dt ,}   (1) 
where 2 is his (fixed) rate of time preference, and ct is his consumption 
at time t.   
  The agent is endowed with y units of the good at any time t.    He also receives monetary 
transfers with real values of Jt from the government. There are two kinds of assets in the model, 
money balances and internationally traded bonds. These bonds have a fixed price of unity in terms of 
the foreign currency (or in terms of goods, as P
*=1), and each bond pays r units of the foreign 
currency at any time. The real assets of the representative agent are 
func {a sub t `` =`` m sub t ``   
+ `` b sub t ,} (2) 
where bt is his bond holdings, and mt his real domestic money holdings. 
  His flow budget constraint is 
func { a dot sub t `` = `` y ``+ `` rb sub t `` + `` tau sub t `` - `` c sub t `` - `` epsilon sub t    ` m sub 
t ; }(3) 
and he should satisfy the intertemporal solvency condition 
 func {Lim from {t `6 ` inf }~ e sup {-r` t} ` a sub t `` >= `` 0.}(4) 
  I will be considering different types of CIA constraints. I will 
start with the simplest case, in which the CIA constraint is on 
consumption only: 
mt=ct.  (5)   4
  the representative agent's problem is to maximize (1), subject to (2)!(5), and the initial condition a0, 
taking the paths of {Jt}, and {,t} as given. Along a perfect foresight path, the agent's expectations 
about {Jt} and {,t} coincide with the actual paths of these variables.   
  In this paper we abstract completely from government expenditures on goods and services, 
and concentrate exclusively on monetary policies.
vii  The government chooses the real monetary 
transfers Jt in order to satisfy its flow constraint, which says that it should finance its expenditures (Jt) 
from the interest on its bond holdings and the inflation tax: 
 
func { tau sub t ``  = ` ` rR sub t `` + `` epsilon sub t ` m sub t , }(6) 
where Rt is the central bank's holdings of foreign reserves, which are in the form of internationally 
traded bonds. I will assume that the exchange rate system is flexible, in which case, with no central 
bank intervention on the foreign exchange market, Rt is constant. 
  To solve the representative agent's problem maximize (1) subject to (2)!(5), and the initial 
condition a0. Using (2) and (5), the current value Hamiltonian for his problem can be written as   
func { H`` = `` U(c sub t ) `` + `` lambda sub t ` left \[    r `(a sub t `` - c sub t )    + `` y ``    + `` tau 
sub t ``- `` ( 1 `` + `` epsilon sub t ) ` c sub t right \] ,}   (7) 
where 8t is the shadow price of at. 
  The optimality conditions are: 
Hc = 0:  
func { U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t `( r `` + `` epsilon sub 
t `` + `` 1)`` = `` 0 ,}       (8) 
func  { -H sub a `` + `` theta sub t ` lambda sub t  `` = `` lambda 
dot sub t `: }func    { (theta `-`r)` lambda sub t    ``= `` lambda dot sub t , }    (9) 
and the transversality condition. 
  From (9) it is clear that a steady state can be reached only if  
 r = 2. (10) 
This  is  a  standard  assumption  that  is  made  in  the  literature  for  models 
involving a small open economy with a fixed rate of time preference. 
(See, for example, Sen and Turnovsky (1989) and Mansoorian (1996).) 
  One can easily show that with the CIA constraint on consumption 
alone, changes in the rate of growth of money will leave the steady 
state unaffected. This will be proven in the next section, because   5
at this stage I would like to show that assumption (10) cannot be made 
when the CIA constraint is placed on all transactions, even those 
involving bonds.  
  As explained in footnote 3 above, in the traditional IS-LM-BP 
models  it  was  assumed  that  all  transactions,  even  those  involving  bonds, 
are subject to CIA constraints. With such CIA constraints, (5) should 
be replaced by  
mt=ct+t,   (11) 
where t is the representative agent's bond purchases at time t. This constraint can be re-written as 
t = mt!ct.     (12) 
  The representative agent's problem will then be to maximize (1) subject to (2)!(4), (12), and 
the initial conditions a0, b0. Using (2) to eliminate mt, the current value Hamiltonian for his problem 
can be written as 
func { H`` = `` `U(c sub t ) `` + `` lambda sub t ` [ r `b sub t `` + `` y ``    + `` tau sub t ``- `` c sub t `` - 
`` epsilon sub t ` ( ` a sub t ``- `` b sub t )] `` + ``    mu sub t ` [ ( a sub t `` -`` b sub t ) `` - `` c sub 
t ] ,}(13) 
where 8t and µt are the shadow prices of at and bt, respectively. 
  The optimality conditions are: 
Hc = 0:  
func { U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t `` - `` mu sub t `` = `` 
0 ,}     (14) 
func  { -H sub a ``+ `` theta sub t ` lambda sub t  `` = `` lambda dot 
sub t `: }func    { (theta ``+`` epsilon sub t )` lambda sub t    ``- `` mu sub t `` = `` lambda dot sub 
t , }   (15) 
func  { -H sub b ``+ `` theta sub t ` mu sub t  `` = `` mu dot sub t 
`: }func  { (theta `` + `` 1) ` mu sub t ``- ``(r ``+`` epsilon sub 
t )` lambda sub t  `` = `` mu dot sub t , }    (16) 
and the standard transversality conditions. 
  Equations (15) and (16) are inconsistent with a steady state. 
Setting  ==0,  one  can  derive  the  following  relationship  which  must  hold 
in a steady state: 
func{ 
(1``+``  theta)  ``  =  ``  {(r``+  ``  epsilon)}  over  {(theta  ``  +  ``  epsilon)}. 
}   (17) 
In the steady state , (the inflation rate) will be equal to the rate 
of growth of money (which is determined by the government), while r   6
and  2  are  fixed.  Thus,  (17)  will  in  general  not  hold;  and  one  can  conclude 
that time separable preferences are not useful in studying the 
implications of this model. 
  The reason for the above conclusion is that with CIA constraints 
on bond purchases, changes in the rate of growth of money affect the 
real rate of return on bonds. There is, therefore, not a fixed real 
rate  of  return  to  which  the  rate  of  time  preference  could  be  set  equal, 
in order to ensure a well defined steady state, as is usually possible 
in small open economy models with fixed rates of time preference. For 
this reason, in the next section Uzawa preferences will be used in 
order to work out the implications of different CIA constraints. 
 
III. The Model with Uzawa Preferences 
  With Uzawa preferences, the rate of time preference is an increasing function of 
instantaneous utility: 
func { {INT _0^ INF } ~ e sup {- INT _0^ t `theta sub v `dv    } ~ U( {c} sub t ) ~ dt ,}   (18) 
where 2v=2(U(cv)), with 2N(")>0, 2NN(")>0, and 2(")!2N(")U(cv)>0.  
  This assumption, regarding the rate of time preference, circumvents the problem encountered 
in the previous section. It, therefore, allows me to work out the effects of different CIA constraints 
for the open economy. 
  With CIA constraints on consumption alone, the problem of the representative agent will now 
be to maximize (18), subject to (2)!(5) and the initial condition a0. In order to solve this problem, it 
is easiest to follow Uzawa and Obstfeld and employ a change of variable from actual time t to 
psychological time as follows. First note that the preferences described by (18) can be expressed as 
    
func { {INT _0^ INF } ~ e sup {- DELTA sub t } `` U(c sub t ) `` dt. } 
 (19) 
where 
func{ {d DELTA sub t} over {dt} `` =`` theta (U( c sub t )) 
. 
}(20)From (20), 
func{ {d t} `` =`` {d DELTA} / { theta (U (c sub t)) } .}Use this result 
in (19), and also in (3), noting that  
func{ {a dot sub t} `` =`` {d a} over { d DELTA} ``theta (U (c sub 
t))  ,} in order to change the variables from actual time t to 
psychological time ). The Hamiltonian for this problem will then be: 
func{ H hat `` = `` H over {theta (U(c)) 
}, 
}(21) 
where H is given by (7).    7
 One  can  readily  show  that  condition  (9)  should  still  hold  (except 
that now 2 is not fixed, but is a function of instantaneous utility), 
while condition (8) is replaced by  
c=0:  
func {  U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t `( r `` + `` epsilon sub 
t `` + `` 1)`` -``{ theta ' (U(c sub t )) ` U'(c sub t ) } `` H hat 
``= ``0. }(22) 
  From (9) it is clear that the steady state level of consumption will not be affected by changes 
in the rate of growth of money (or the steady state inflation rate). Using the government budget 
constraint (6) in the representative agent's flow constraint (3), it is clear that the steady state bond 
holdings of the representative agent is also unaffected. (Recall that Rt is constant.) It follows that the 
country's steady state net foreign asset position (R+b) will also be unaffected.     
  This is analogous to Stockman's result for a closed economy. With the CIA constraint on 
consumption, an increase in the inflation rate increases the costs corresponding to consumption in the 
present period. The CIA constraint on consumption also increases the costs corresponding to 
consumption resulting from future interest payments on bonds. Hence, the increase in the inflation 
rate reduces the benefits from current consumption and the benefits from consumption of future 
returns on current bond holdings by the same amount, leaving the steady state unaffected.   
  Next, consider the case in which there are CIA constraints on all transactions, even those 
involving bonds. The problem of the representative agent will now be to maximize (18), subject to 
(2)!(4), (12) and the initial conditions a0 and b0. Switching from real to psychological time, and 
writing the current value Hamiltonian =H/(2(U(c)), where H is given by (13), one can readily show 
that conditions (15) and (16) should still hold (except that now 2 is not fixed, but is a function of 
instantaneous utility), while condition (14) is replaced by   
c=0:  
func {  
 U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t  `` - `` mu sub t `` -    
  ``{ theta ' (U(c sub t )) ` U'(c sub t )} `` H hat `` = `` 0 . }(23) 
  As before, with ==0, (17) must hold in the steady state. Thus, with 2 a function of 
instantaneous utility, we will have 
func{ {d c bar } over {d epsilon } ~ = ~ { - theta} over { theta ' `` left \[ ` 2 theta `` + `` epsilon `` + `` 
1 `right    \] } ~ < ~ 0 . } (24) 
Steady state consumption  will fall after an increase in the rate of 
growth of money (an increase in steady state inflation ,). From (11),   8
the steady state real money holdings of the representative agent also 
falls.   
  Using the government budget constraint (6) in (3), it is clear 
that the steady state bond holdings of the representative agent  will 
fall with the rise in the rate of growth of money. With  smaller, and 
R unaffected, the country's steady state net foreign asset position 
deteriorates.  
  The intuition for these results is as follows. An increase in 
the  rate  of  growth  of  money  acts  as  a  tax  on  bond  purchases.  This  reduces 
the return on savings, increasing consumption (and likely also the 
real money holdings) in the short run.
viii  The country, therefore, runs a current 
account deficit, and both c and m fall along the adjustment path to the steady state equilibrium. 
    It will be instructive to contrast these results with Obstfeld's (1981a,b), who also uses 
Uzawa preferences, but introduces money into the model as an argument in the instantaneous utility 
function. In Obstfeld's model there is a unique level of utility which must be maintained in the steady 
state. This is determined by the equality of the rate of time preference with the real rate of interest 
(which is unaffected by monetary policy). Thus, an increase in the rate of growth of money, by 
increasing steady state inflation, will result in a fall in steady state real money holdings and a rise in 
steady state consumption. In order to increase steady state consumption, the representative agent 
must be accumulating assets along the adjustment path. Thus, in the short run after the increase in the 
rate of growth of money there will be a sharp fall in consumption and real money holdings, leading to 
a current account surplus. After that, both consumption and real money holdings increase along the 
adjustment path to the new steady state equilibrium. 
  Hence, the results obtained with CIA constraints are in sharp contrast to Obstfeld's. As 
pointed out in footnote 3, the assumption that all transaction, including those involving bonds, are 
subject to CIA constraint was implicit in the traditional models involving the IS-LM-BP framework. 
 
IV. The Model with Investment 
  Until now the discussion has been confined to an endowment economy. In this section, I 
assume that output is produced with a neo-classical production function, yt=f(kt), where kt is the   9
capital stock at time t, fN(")>0, and fNN(")<0. Substituting for y into (3), we obtain the representative 
agent's flow budget constraint 
func { a dot sub t `` = `` f(k sub t ) ``+ `` rb sub t `` + `` tau sub t `` - `` c sub t `` - `` epsilon sub t    ` 
m sub t , }(25) 
  Assuming for simplicity that all domestic capital is held by the 
representative agent, his total asset holdings are now  
func {a sub t `` =`` m sub t ``  
+ `` b sub t`` + `` k sub t  .} (26) 
  When all expenditures are subject to CIA constraints, we have 
mt=ct+t+It,   (27) 
where It denotes Investment expenditures at time t. One can re-write (27) as     
t=mt!ct!It.   (28) 
  Without depreciation and perfect reversibility of capital, we will have 
t=It.   (29) 
  The problem of the representative agent is now to maximize (18), subject to (25), (26), (28), 
(29), (4), and the initial conditions, a0, b0 and k0.    Using (26) to eliminate mt, and switching from 
real time t to psychological time ), the current value Hamiltonian for his problem can be written as 
func { H hat `` = `` 1 over { theta (U(c)) } ` left \[ `U(c sub t ) `` 
+ `` lambda sub t ` [ r `b sub t `` + ``f( k sub t ) ``  + `` tau sub 
t ``- `` c sub t `` - `` epsilon sub t ` ( ` a sub t ``- `` b sub t `` 
- `` k sub t )] `` + ``  mu sub t ` [ ( a sub t `` -`` b sub t `` - `` 
k sub t ) `` - `` c sub t`` - `` I sub t  ] ``+ `` omega sub t ` I sub 
t` right \],}(30) 
where 8t, µt, and Tt are the shadow prices of at, bt, and kt respectively. 
  The optimality conditions are: 
c = 0:  
func {  
 U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t  `` - `` mu sub t `` -    
  `` theta ' (U(c sub t )) ` U'(c sub t ) ``H hat `` = `` 0 , }(31) 
I = 0:  Tt ! µt = 0  (32) 
func  {  - d [H `` e sup { - DELTA }]`/ `d a `` = `` d [ lambda `` e 
sup  {- DELTA} ]`/ d DELTA ``: }func    { (theta ``+`` epsilon sub t )` lambda sub t    ``- `` 
mu sub t `` = `` lambda dot sub t , }   (33) 
func  {  - d [H `` e sup { - DELTA }]`/ `d b `` = `` d [ mu `` e sup 
{ - DELTA} ]`/ d DELTA ``: }       
func  { (theta `` + `` 1) ` mu sub t ``- ``(r ``+`` epsilon sub t )` 
lambda sub t  `` = `` mu dot sub t , }    (34) 
func  {  - d [H `` e sup { - DELTA }]`/ `d k `` = `` d [ omega  `` e 
sup  {- DELTA }]`/ d DELTA ``: }func  { theta sub t ` omega sub t `` 
+ `` mu sub t ``- ``[f' (k sub t)  ``+`` epsilon sub t ]`` lambda sub 
t  `` = `` omega dot sub t , }    (35)   10
and the standard transversality conditions. 
 From  (32),  Tt = µt for all t. Using this in (35), and then noting that in a steady state ==0, it 
follows from (34) and (35) that the steady state capital stock, , is determined by   
fN() = r.    (36) 
  With r fixed, the steady state capital stock is unaffected by an increase in the rate of growth 
of money. The reason is that, with CIA constraints on both investment and bond purchases, changes 
in the rate of growth of money acts as a tax on both capital and bond holdings by exactly the same 
amount.
ix 
  Moreover, (33) and (34) imply that (17) must hold in the steady state; and, therefore, an 
increase in the rate of growth of money must reduce the steady state consumption (result (24)). As in 
Section III, the increase in the rate of growth of money reduces the real rate of return on bonds and 
investment, reducing savings and steady state consumption. 
  Now consider the case in which investment is not subject to CIA constraint, while all other 
transactions are. Then, the representative agent will still face constraints (25), (26), (29) and (4), as 
before, while constraint (28) will be replaced by   
t=mt!ct.   (34) 
  Writing the current value Hamiltonian with psychological time, it can be easily shown that 
conditions (31), and (33)!(35) will be the same as before, while condition (32) becomes   
µt = 0.  (38) 
  Substituting for µt from (38) into (33) and (35), it can be easily shown that in the steady state 
we should have 
fN() = 2(U()).  (39) 
Moreover, (33) and (34) also imply that (17) must hold in the steady state; and, therefore, an increase 
in the steady state inflation rate , (or an increase in the rate of growth of money) will lead a fall in 
steady state consumption (result (24)).    The fall in , from (39), implies that the steady state capital 
stock must increase (recall that 2N(")>0 and fNN(")<0). 
  The reason for these results is as follows. An increase in the rate of growth of money, by 
increasing the inflation rate, acts as a tax on bond holdings, while without CIA constraints on   11
investment, it leaves the return on capital unaffected. As a result, investment in capital becomes more 
attractive. At the same time, as in Section III, the lower return on bonds reduces savings, and steady 
state consumption. 
  One can conclude that as long as there are some adjustment cost for investment which are not 
subject to CIA constraints, then an increase in the rate of growth of money will lead to an increase in 




  In the literature concerned with the policy issues for open economies, money is usually 
introduced into the model by assuming that instantaneous utility depends on real money holdings. In 
this literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the alternative method of introducing money 
into the model!through CIA constraints.   
  This paper has explored the implications of different types of CIA constraints for open 
economies. It was shown that if only consumption expenditures are subject to CIA constraints then 
changes in the rate of growth of money would not have any steady state effects. 
  It was argued (footnote 3) that the implicit assumption in the traditional literature, employing 
the IS-LM-BP model, was that all transactions, including those involving bonds, were subject to CIA 
constraints. It was shown that with CIA constraints on all transactions, utility functions involving 
fixed rates of time preference are no longer useful. The reason was that, then, changes in the rate of 
growth of money affect the rate of return on assets, and, therefore, there is no fixed real rate of 
interest to which the rate of time preference could be set equal. 
  To circumvent the above problem, Uzawa preferences were used to show that if all 
transactions are subject to CIA constraints, then an increase in the rate of growth of money will 
reduce savings, bringing about a current account deficit, and reducing steady state consumption and 
real money holdings. The results were compared to Obstfeld's, where Uzawa preferences were also 
used, but money was introduced into the model by assuming that instantaneous utility depends on 
real balances. It was shown that the results with CIA constraint were in sharp contrast to those with 
money in the utility function.   12
  Finally, investment was introduced into the model. It was shown that if all transactions were 
subject to CIA constraints then an increase in the rate of growth of money would leave the steady 
state capital unaffected. The reason was that then the higher inflation rate would reduce the return on 
bonds and capital in the same way. On the other hand, if investment is not subject to CIA constraints 
then an increase in the rate of growth of money will increase steady state capital, because, then, the 
higher inflation would reduce the return on bonds, and not the return on capital. It was argued that if 
there are some investment adjustment costs which are not subject to CIA constraints then an increase 
in the rate of growth of money would increase steady state capital.     13
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 Appendix 
Proof of the Results on Page 9 
  
  With Uzawa preferences we have 
    
func { {INT _0^ INF } ~ e sup {- DELTA sub t } `` U(c sub t ) `` 
dt. }   (19) 
where 
func{ {d DELTA sub t} over {dt} `` =`` theta (U( c sub t )) 
. 
}(20) 
 From  (20), 
func{ {d t} `` =`` {d DELTA} / { theta (U (c sub t)) } .}Using 
this result in (19), we can change time from 
 actual time t to psychological time ). Preferences can then be 
written as 
    
func { {INT _0^ INF } ~ e sup {- DELTA } `` U(c ) `` d DELTA. } 
 (A.1) 
Moreover, from (20) it follows that 
func{ a dot sub t `` =`` {d a sub t} over {dt} `` =`` {theta (U( c 
sub t ))}``{ d a } over { d DELTA} 
. 
}(A.2) 
Using (A.2) in (3), we can express the law of motion for a in 
psychological time as 
func{ {d a } over { d DELTA} `` = `` 1 over {theta (U(c))} `` left 




  Hence, with psychological time the Hamiltonian for this 
problem will be: 
func{ H hat `` = `` H over {theta (U(c)) 
}, 
}(21) 
where H is given by (7). The optimality conditions will be 
c=0:  
func {  U' (c sub t ) `` - `` lambda sub t `( r `` + `` epsilon 
sub t `` + `` 1)`` -``{ theta ' (U(c sub t )) ` U'(c sub t ) } 
`` H hat ``= ``0, }(22) 
and  
func{ 
{d` left \[ e sup {- DELTA} ` lambda right \]} over {d`  DELTA} 
`` = `` - `{d` left \[ e sup {- DELTA} ` H hat right \]} over {d`  
a}   15
}  Y    
func{ - ` lambda `` + `` {d lambda} over { d DELTA} `` = `` - H 
hat sub a . }(A.4) 
  Using (20) in (A.4), we obtain   
func{ - ` lambda `` + `` 1 over { theta} ` {d lambda} over { d t} `` = `` - H hat sub a , } 
which is equation (9) in the text. 
 The  results  in  the  rest  of  the  paper  can  be  similarly  derived. 
Roughly, with Uzawa preferences, the differential equations for 
co-state variables along the optimal path (such as (9)), and the 
optimality conditions with respect to any control variable other 
than c will be as with time separable preferences. The optimality 
condition with respect to c will have an extra term !2NUN on the 
left hand side. 
                         
i    On exception to this is Calvo (1987), who considers a balance of payment crisis in an open 
economy with a cash in advance constraint on consumption. 
ii    According to Turnovsky (1997, p. 20), the reason for such scant attention paid to the CIA 
approach may be that "One difficulty with this approach is that the introduction of the various 
constraints, embodying the role played by money in transactions, can very quickly become 
intractable. Accordingly, a shorthand alternative to this . . . is to introduce money into the utility 
function." See also Turnovsky (1995, p. 265). Similarly, Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 155) state 
that "Models based explicitly on (CIA) constraints . . . can quickly become analytically 
cumbersome. Much of the research on the effects of money has taken a different shortcut, that 
of . . . putting real money services directly in the utility function." 
iiiIn the IS-LM-BP framework with perfect capital mobility, when domestic interest rates were 
above (below) foreign rates, there was a huge capital inflow (outflow), and balance of payments 
surplus (deficit). This implied an excess demand for (supply of) the domestic currency on the 
foreign exchange market, which raised (lowered) the value of the domestic currency. The implicit 
assumption here is that all transactions (even the ones involving bonds) are financed with money. 
iv    With money in the utility function the real rate of return on bonds is not affected by changes in 
the rate of growth of money. 
v    This is contrary to Stockman's conclusion for a closed economy. In his model, if there is a CIA 
constraint on investment then the steady state capital will fall when there is an increase in the rate 
of growth of money.   
vi    Again, this is contrary to Stockman's findings for a closed economy. He shows that if there is 
no CIA constraint for investment then the steady state capital is unaffected by an increase in the 
rate of growth of money. 
vii    Obstfeld (1981a) allows for government purchases of goods and services. He, however, 
assumes that such government expenditures are unproductive, or, alternatively, that the utility of   16
                                                                            
the representative agent is strongly separable between private consumption and public goods. We 
could make this assumption without changing any of our results. 
viii    From (11), if in the short run ct increases while t falls, mt may fall or rise. 
ix    This results for the open economy is in contrast to Stockman's result for a closed economy. In 
Stockman's model, when there was a CIA constraint on all transactions, an increase in the rate of 
growth of money reduced the steady state capital stock, because in his model the increase in the 
rate of steady state inflation rate taxed holdings of capital, reducing savings and thus investment. 
x    Investment adjustment costs which would not be subject to CIA constraints would include 
intangible costs resulting from congestion in the firm. 